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Judicial review ensures that actions taken by the legislative and the executive
branches of government are subject to some degree of oversight.1 It guarantees that
government actions are within the bounds of law.2 For foreign nationals seeking to
enter the United States, whether for work, education, or familial reasons, judicial
review of the government’s decision to deny a visa is generally unavailable.3 Courts
have held for over seventy-five years that a consular official’s decision regarding visa
grants and denials is beyond review.4 This is known as the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability.5 As a result of the courts’ refusal to review such decisions, consular
officers have very broad powers in deciding visa applications.6 This presents a
practical challenge for foreign nationals when a consular officer denies them a visa.7
An individual officer’s decision regarding a visa can cause someone to lose a “dream
job” in the United States. However, not all hope is lost. Recently, some courts have
held that an applicant who was denied a visa may possess a limited judicial remedy.8
In American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano, the Second Circuit held that the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not preclude a court from engaging in a
“limited judicial review” when a visa denial by a consular officer implicates a U.S.
citizen’s First Amendment rights.9 This case comment contends that, while the
court’s holding is limited to plaintiffs with First Amendment claims, the decision
1.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

2.

Id.

3.

See United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir. 1927) (establishing the doctrine of
consular absolutism, noting that “whether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is not for us
to determine”); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929).

4.

See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197
F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Consular nonreviewability applies to both immigrant and
nonimmigrant visas. See Li Hing of H.K. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the doctrine
to nonimmigrant visas); DePena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying judicial
review of an immigrant visa).

5.

Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159.

6.

See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006), which exempts consular
officers’ decisions to grant or deny visas from reviewability by the Secretary of State. This limitation of
the Secretary of State’s authority has been understood as eliminating both administrative and judicial
review. Some scholars have traced federal court deference in this area to the plenary powers of Congress
in immigration. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543 (finding actions taken by the political branches of government
immune from review by the courts “unless expressly authorized by law”); see also Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). For an extensive overview of consular visa decisions, see James
A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1991).

7.

For a discussion of a lawyer’s role in advocating for visa applicants, see Andrew T. Chan & Robert A.
Free, The Lawyer’s Role in Consular Visa Refusals, Immigr. Briefings, Apr. 2008, at 1; Stewart
Matthews, Consular Practice: Immigrant Visas, Md. B.J., Dec. 2008, at 72. For an argument on extending
review to certain visas which carry important interests, see Maria Zas, Comment, Consular Absolutism:
The Need For Judicial Review In The Adjudication of Immigrant Visas For Permanent Residence, 37 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 577 (2004).

8.

See Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008); Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647–
49 (1st Cir. 1990); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

9.

573 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2009).
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has potentially far-reaching consequences regarding future application of the doctrine
of consular nonreviewability. By recognizing this limited exception and expanding
the grounds on which a visa denial may be reviewed, the Second Circuit has opened
the door for other challenges to this doctrine. This could provide a basis for courts to
recognize a broader exception that would allow judicial review of visa denials that
implicate any constitutional interest of U.S. citizens or companies.
Tariq Ramadan is a well-known, Swiss-born academic who, at the time, was a
Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Oriental Studies at
Oxford University.10 The University of Notre Dame offered Ramadan a teaching
position in January 2004.11 After Ramadan accepted the position, Notre Dame
submitted an H-1B visa petition to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) to allow Ramadan to come to the United States and teach for the university.12
USCIS initially approved the visa petition.13 Ramadan planned to move to the United
States in August 2004.14 But in July 2004, Ramadan’s H-1B visa was revoked by the
U.S. Embassy in Bern, Switzerland.15 Ramadan was subsequently told that he could
reapply for a visa.16 In October 2004, Notre Dame filed a second H-1B petition for
Ramadan.17 After receiving no decision on that petition from USCIS by December
2004, Ramadan was forced to resign from the Notre Dame teaching position.18
In September 2005, Ramadan applied for a visitor’s visa (known as a “B visa”) so
that he could attend academic conferences.19 A consular officer at the U.S. Embassy
in Bern interviewed Ramadan in December 2005.20 Ramadan was questioned about
his political views and associations to which he had either belonged or donated
money.21 During the interview, the officer discovered that Ramadan had donated
approximately $1336 to the Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP) between 1998

10.

Biography, tariqRAMADAN, http://www.tariqramadan.com/Biography,11.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011).

11.

Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 119.

12.

Id. An H1-B category visa applies to people who wish to perform services in a specialty occupation. See
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) (2010).

13.

Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 119.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. No explanation was given for why Ramadan’s visa had been revoked. Id.

16.

Id. at 120.

17.

Id.

18.

Id. DHS subsequently rejected the second petition. Id.

19.

Id. Some of the conferences Ramadan sought to attend were sponsored by the American Academy of
Religion. The American Academy of Religion is a professional organization of academics who research
or teach in areas related to religion. The organization’s website is available at Am. Acad. of Religion,
http://www.aarweb.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).

20. Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 120.
21.

Id.
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and 2002.22 The ASP was designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Treasury
Department in 2003 because of financial support it had given to Hamas, the
Palestinian Islamic organization.23 Ramadan was not notified of a decision regarding
that second visa application as well.24
In January 2006, the American Academy of Religion filed a suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging Ramadan’s
exclusion from the United States based on the July 2004 revocation of Ramadan’s
H-1B visa and the government’s failure to act on Ramadan’s B visa petition.25 In June
2006, the district court ordered the Department of Homeland Security to issue a
decision on Ramadan’s B visa petition within ninety days. 26 Ramadan was notified in
September 2006 that his B visa had been denied because he provided “material
support to a terrorist organization.” 27 Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment,
arguing in part that the government’s failure to render a final decision on Ramadan’s
pending visa application violated their First Amendment rights by preventing them
from engaging in academic exchange with Ramadan, in person.28 The government
cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that Congress’s plenary power to
control immigration policy and the delegation of that power to the executive branch
allowed them to exclude Ramadan as a matter of law.29

22.

Id.

23.

Id. The INA renders inadmissible any alien who provides “material support” to a terrorist organization.
See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). Material support
is defined broadly and can include providing “funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit.” See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).

24.

Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 120. Ramadan eventually discovered in September 2006 that the
consulate had denied his visa petition because the government claimed that he had provided material
support to a terrorist organization. Id.

25.

Id. Because Ramadan is an “unadmitted and nonresident alien,” he has no constitutional right of entry
to the United States. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). Thus, he was a symbolic
plaintiff, and the American Academy of Religion asserted its First Amendment rights in bringing the
case. See Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 122.

26. Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 120. Interestingly, by issuing the order to the government, the court

effectively recognized an additional exception (beyond that espoused in Mandel ) to the doctrine of
consular nonreviewability. “Normally a consular official’s discretionary decision to grant or deny a visa
petition is not subject to judicial review,” but, when a consular officer has not taken any action on a visa
petition, a court will have jurisdiction to compel an officer to adjudicate the petition. Patel v. Reno, 134
F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1997).

27.

Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 120.

28. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, 463 F. Supp. 2d 400, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Mandel, 408 U.S. at

760.

29. Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 125. Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration has long been

recognized and upheld by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1895).
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The district court granted the government’s motion and dismissed the complaint.30
The court noted that federal courts are precluded under the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign national’s challenge to a
denied visa application. 31 The court then discussed the applicability of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel to American Academy of Religion.32
Mandel concerned a Belgian scholar and self-described “revolutionary Marxist”
who was invited to the United States to attend a conference at Stanford University
and to lecture at various other American universities.33 Mandel’s visa was denied,
based in part on a finding by the Department of State that, during previous trips to
the United States, he engaged in activities beyond his stated itinerary.34 The State
Department asked the Attorney General to waive Mandel’s inadmissibility pursuant
to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(d). 35 The Attorney
General declined to exercise discretion and affirmed “that Mandel’s temporary
admission was not authorized.” 36 Mandel, along with a group of U.S. citizens
including the university professors who had invited Mandel to speak at several
universities, challenged his exclusion from the United States.37 The plaintiffs alleged
that Mandel’s denial deprived them of their First Amendment right to “hear his
views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.”38
The Supreme Court held that, “when the Executive exercises this power [to
exclude aliens] . . . on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion nor test it by balancing
its justification against First Amendment interests.”39 However, the Court declined
to address what “First Amendment or other grounds” could provide a basis for
challenging a negative exercise of discretion where no justification was given.40 The
Court found that the “Attorney General did inform Mandel’s counsel of the reason
30. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 588(PAC), 2007 WL 4527504 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20,

2007).

31.

Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 121.

32.

Id. (discussing Mandel, 408 U.S. 753).

33.

Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756. It is interesting to consider to what extent the Supreme Court decided Mandel on
the basis of the value of his physical presence for engaging in discussion. In the opinion, the Court noted
that, because Mandel was excluded from the United States, he missed a speaking engagement sponsored
by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars Conference. His speech was to be on
Revolutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries. Id. at 757. The Court noted that he gave the speech via
transatlantic telephone. Id. at 759. It is significant that the Court did not consider as a factor in its decision
that Mandel was still able to deliver the speech.

34. Id. at 758–59.
35.

Id. at 759.

36. Id.
37.

Id. at 759–60.

38. Id. at 760.
39.

Id. at 770.

40. Id.
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for refusing [to grant him] a waiver. And that reason was facially legitimate and bona
fide.”41 Thus, the Court recognized a limited First Amendment right to “hear, speak,
and debate” with a visa applicant, allowing a court to review the Attorney General’s
decision not to waive inadmissibility of a visa applicant.42
In its decision on the merits, the district court in American Academy of Religion,
based on the holding in Mandel, found that U.S. citizens may challenge a visa denial
based on a violation of their First Amendment right to receive information.43 The
district court found that federal jurisdiction is proper in such a case.44 In the absence
of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on how to determine whether the consular
officer had a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for excluding Ramadan, the
district court applied a three-part inquiry to the facts before it.45 The district court
analyzed whether the government provided a reason for the denial of the visa,
whether there was a statutory basis for the denial, and finally, whether the provision
was properly applied to the facts at hand.46 In its analysis, the court found that the
defendants “had provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying
Ramadan’s visa,” relying on Ramadan’s “donations to organizations supporting
known terrorist organizations.”47 As a result, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment while granting that of the defendants.48
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision, again seeking to use the narrow
exception from Mandel to challenge the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.49 The
defendants contended that Mandel did not apply to the facts of American Academy of
Religion because Mandel addressed a situation in which a court “reviewed the
Attorney General’s discretionary decision not to waive . . . inadmissibility,” while
American Academy of Religion dealt with a consular officer’s decision to deny a visa—a
decision that the defendant argued is immune from review pursuant to INA
section 104(a).50 To determine whether Mandel was controlling in this case, the
Second Circuit looked to precedent subsequent to Mandel from the Ninth, First, and
D.C. Circuits.51
In Bustamante v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit was faced with an American citizen
seeking review of a consular officer’s decision not to grant a visa to her Mexican
41.

Id. at 769.

42.

Id. at 762.

43.

Am. Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 588(PAC), 2007 WL 4527504, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
20, 2007).

44. Id.
45.

Id. at *11.

46. Id.
47.

Id.

48. Id. at *13.
49. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2009).
50. Id. at 123.
51.

Id. at 124.
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husband.52 The court found that, when a visa denial violates a U.S. citizen’s
constitutional rights, a limited judicial review is required in order to determine whether
the consular officer has a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying the
visa.53 In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on Mandel.54 The Bustamante
court found that, as long as a constitutional challenge is raised, a citizen is entitled to
a “highly constrained review solely to determine whether the consular official acted
on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”55 The Ninth Circuit found
that the plaintiff, Ima Bustamante, had a protected liberty interest in her marriage
“that [gave] rise to a right to constitutionally adequate procedures in the adjudication
of her husband’s visa application.”56 Because Bustamante was a U.S. citizen and raised
a constitutionally protected right (i.e., a procedural due process claim), the Court
engaged in the limited inquiry permitted by Mandel and considered whether the
explanation for the denial of her Mexican husband’s visa application was facially
legitimate and bona fide.57 The Ninth Circuit found the reason was both facially
legitimate and bona fide, and affirmed the judgment of the district court.58 Importantly,
the court noted in a footnote that:
We are unable to distinguish Mandel on the grounds that the exclusionary
decision challenged in that case was not a consular visa denial, but rather the
Attorney General’s refusal to waive Mandel’s inadmissibility. The holding is
plainly stated in terms of the power delegated by Congress to “the Executive.”
The Supreme Court said nothing to suggest that the reasoning or outcome
would vary according to which executive officer is exercising the
Congressionally-delegated power to exclude.59

In Allende v. Shultz, the First Circuit decided a case involving Hortensia de
Allende, the widow of the former president of Chile, Salvador Allende.60 She had
applied to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, for a visa in response to an
invitation to speak during International Women’s Week in San Francisco.61 Allende
was found ineligible for a visa under a provision of the INA that barred the admission
of aliens who “advocate communism or are affiliated with communist organizations.”62
Allende’s admission to the United States was also determined to be “prejudicial to
52.

531 F.3d 1059, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008).

53.

Id. at 1062.

54. Id.
55.

Id. at 1060.

56. Id. at 1062.
57.

Id.

58. Id.
59.

Id. at 1062 n.1 (emphasis added).

60. 845 F.2d 1111, 1112–13 (1st Cir. 1988).
61.

Id. at 1112–13.

62. Id. at 1113. Allende was excluded under a section of the INA similar to that found in the present statute

at INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(i) (2006 & Supp. I 2007).
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the foreign policy interests of the United States.”63 The consular officer denied her
the visa accordingly and forwarded the application to the Secretary of State who
declined to grant a waiver for her ineligibility and affirmed the consular officer’s
denial.64 The plaintiffs, scholars who had extended speaking invitations to Allende,
alleged that the misapplication of the waiver provision violated their First Amendment
right to receive information as recognized in Mandel.65 The First Circuit implicitly
rejected the distinction between a consular officer’s denial of a visa and the Attorney
General’s denial of a waiver, and went on to engage in a limited judicial review as set
forth by Mandel.66
In Abourezk v. Reagan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
heard an appeal involving three consolidated district court actions that challenged
four separate visa denials by consular officers in Cuba, Italy, and Nicaragua.67 The
plaintiffs, who included members of Congress, professors, and civic leaders, argued
that by continuing to exclude foreign nationals who had been invited by the plaintiffs
to speak in the United States, the State Department was violating their First
Amendment right to “engage in dialogue” with the foreign nationals.68 The court
found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case based, in part, on the holding in
Mandel. In doing so, the court implicitly rejected the distinction between a consular
officer’s denial of a visa and the Attorney General’s denial of a waiver.69 The court of
appeals remanded the cases for examination of the visa denials to ensure that the
government action was within the “statutory and constitutional authority of the State
Department.”70
After reviewing these circuit court cases, the Second Circuit in American Academy
of Religion rejected the defendant’s distinction between a visa denial by a consular
officer and the Attorney General’s decision not to waive inadmissibility.71 The court
reasoned that, if some judicial review is permitted for the Attorney General’s
63. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1114.
64. Id. at 1112.
65.

Id. at 1114. For an additional example of a First Amendment challenge to the denial of a visa application,
see Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647–50 (1st Cir. 1990).

66. See Allende, 845 F.2d at 1116, 1119–21.
67.

785 F.2d 1043, 1048–50 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

68. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that the denial exceeded the State Department’s statutory authority

under section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163, 182 (repealed 1990). Mandel, 785 F.2d at 1049. This section provides that certain aliens are
excludable if “the Attorney General has reason to believe that the alien ‘seeks to enter the United States
solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest
or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.’” Id. at 1047 (quoting INA § 212(a)(27)).
When a consular officer faced with such an applicant deems the applicant ineligible on the above
statutory grounds, the application is then forwarded to the State Department for advice, and the
possibility of a waiver. Id. at 1048.

69. Id. at 1050.
70. Id. at 1062.
71.

Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2009).
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discretionary decision, it would only be logical to extend the same review to a consular
officer’s decision regarding an applicant’s statutory ineligibility where First
Amendment interests are at issue.72 The court held that, “where a plaintiff, with
standing to do so, asserts a First Amendment claim to have a visa applicant present
views in this country, we should apply Mandel to a consular officer’s denial of a
visa.”73 The court then remanded the case for further proceedings.74
In American Academy of Religion, the Second Circuit left the door of consular
nonreviewability ajar by announcing a narrow exception for plaintiffs raising First
Amendment claims. Despite the narrow holding, the court’s willingness to recognize
an exception shows a cautious establishment of a judicial role in consular matters.75
This signals to future plaintiffs that the courts may be willing to follow the Ninth
Circuit in extending reviewability where any constitutional claim of a U.S. citizen is
implicated by the denial of a visa. As one commentator noted, the holding in American
Academy of Religion has “potentially far-reaching consequences” for immigration
matters because judicial review of consular decisions is not typically within the
purview of the courts.76
Lower courts have consistently bound themselves by the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability,77 and Mandel is the only Supreme Court case that has addressed
the doctrine.78 In Mandel, the Supreme Court noted that an unadmitted foreign
national has no right of entry into the country.79 Instead, the Court relied on the

72. Id.
73. Id.
74.

Id. at 138. In regards to the safe-harbor exception found in INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd), an
alien is barred from admission if that alien engaged in terrorist activity “unless [he] can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that [he] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
organization was a terrorist organization.” Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 138. The court remanded
the case in order to determine whether the consular officer “confronted Ramandan with the allegation
of knowledge that ASP had funded Hamas and provided him some opportunity thereafter to negate
such knowledge.” Id. at 134.

75. The holding is narrow because the court affirmed the view that a foreign national has no constitutional

right to challenge the denial of a visa. Id. at 125, 128. But, the court also endorsed the idea that a U.S.
citizen has such a right in the limited situation where a First Amendment claim is implicated. Id. at 121.

76. Rami D. Fakhoury, Second Circuit Confirms that Consular Decisions Are Reviewable, Immigr. Daily,

http://www.ilw.com/articles/2009,0903-fakhoury.shtm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L.
Rev. 1615, 1619–20 (2000).

77.

For a general discussion of the doctrine and how courts adhere to it, despite criticism from scholars, see
Legomsky, supra note 76; Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials: The American Consul as 20th Century
Absolute Monarch, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 887, 888 (1987) (noting that American consular officers
stationed abroad are “probably the only administrative employees of the United States government
whose functions have been insulated from administrative and judicial review”).

78. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
79. Id. at 762.
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plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to “hear, speak, and debate” with Mandel, in
person, in order to find jurisdiction.80
The INA provision under which Mandel was denied entry addressed an
exclusionary ground that could be waived upon approval from the Secretary of State.81
Critical to the present case is the fact that the Court in Mandel was considering a
non-consular denial of a waiver of inadmissibility, not a consular visa determination.82
Scholars point out that Mandel did not answer the question of whether limited
judicial review is available outside of cases dealing with discretionary waivers.83 In
American Academy of Religion, the Second Circuit gave its first indication that it is
willing to take a less restricted view of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.
The court read the ambiguity in Mandel as leaving open the possibility that judicial
review might be appropriate when based on a plaintiff ’s First Amendment claims.84
By authorizing judicial review of a consular officer’s visa determination, the court
held that such review was appropriate.85 This establishes a role for the judiciary in an
area previously considered closed to the courts.
80. Id.
81.

Id. at 755. Specifically, the provisions were sections 212(a)(28)(D), (G)(v), and 212(d)(3)(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)). These provisions rendered individuals who had promoted Communism
inadmissible unless the Attorney General waived inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(d)(3)(A). Id.

82. Mandel was not a consular review case. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir.

2009). Arguably, there is a difference between Congressional delegation of plenary power to consular
officers for visa determinations and a provision for a discretionary review by the Attorney General of a
visa denial. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156–59 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

83. See Nafziger, supra note 6, at 32–33 (“[I]t is unclear whether the Court considered this case to be

reviewable only because it involved a first amendment issue, that is, an issue involving specially protected
constitutional guarantees. It is also unclear whether reviewability is available after Mandel in all cases
involving the exercise of executive discretion, or just those involving waiver denials.”); see also David A.
Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and other Unappealing Cases: The Next Frontier of Immigration
Reform, 27 Va. J. Int’l L. 803, 810 (1987).

84. Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 125. While the Second Circuit’s decision may not seem groundbreaking

because of its narrow holding, very few federal courts have formally adopted this stance. See, e.g., De
Castro v. Fairman, 164 F. App’x 930, 934 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability precluded review of a mandamus petition and that a naturalized citizen who alleged a
due process violation did not warrant circumvention of the applicability of the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability); Doan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 160 F.3d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1998)
(finding that absent express statutory language to the contrary, a decision of an INS district director (“a
functional equivalent to a consular official”) was not subject to judicial review); Centeno v. Shultz, 817
F.2d 1212, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Li Hing of H.K., Inc. v. Levin,
800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t has been consistently held that the consular official’s decision
to issue or withhold a visa is not subject either to administrative or judicial review.”).

85. For an example of a court coming to the opposite conclusion, see Centeno, 817 F.2d at 1213–14. Centeno,

a Filipino citizen, applied at the U.S. Embassy in Manila for a visitor’s visa, which the consular officer
denied. Id. at 1213. A lawsuit was filed by Centeno’s brother-in-law, a U.S. citizen. Id. The Fifth
Circuit noted that:
Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, the denial of visas to aliens is not subject to review by the
federal courts. Such review is limited solely to the determination of whether a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason exists for the denial of the waiver. Since Centeno was

1182

VOLUME 55 | 2010/11

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

As mentioned above, three other jurisdictions have taken the Second Circuit’s
approach: the Ninth Circuit in Bustamante,86 the D.C. Circuit in Abourezk,87 and the
First Circuit in Allende.88 Resolving the ambiguity in favor of judicial review signals
that the Second Circuit might be open to expanding jurisdiction beyond First
Amendment claims.89 This case comment contends that the Second Circuit should
follow the Ninth Circuit and expand review to encompass any constitutional challenge
brought by a U.S. citizen.
The Second Circuit cited with approval the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Bustamante regarding the lack of a distinction between a consular visa denial and a
discretionary waiver.90 In Bustamante, the case in which a U.S. citizen sought review
of a consular officer’s decision not to grant a visa to her Mexican husband,91 the court
found that, where a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights have been violated by the
denial of a visa, then a limited judicial review is required in order to determine
whether the consular officer has a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for
denying the visa.92 In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on Mandel to
find that, along with First Amendment claims, a citizen is entitled to limited judicial
inquiry when the liberty interest of marriage is implicated in a visa determination.93
The court found that Bustamante’s constitutional challenge involved her protected
liberty interest in marriage, a due process issue, and “consider[ed] the Consulate’s
denied a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b), which does not provide for a waiver, however,
the denial of the visa is not subject to any review by federal court.

Id. at 1213–14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
86. 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2008).
87.

785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

88. 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988). In Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit also held

that exceptions existed to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Id. at 647–50. In that case, Gerry
Adams, former president of Sinn Fein, sought to enter the United States for speaking engagements. Id. at
645. His visa application was denied based in part on the State Department’s belief that he was “engaged
in terrorist activities” through his affiliation with the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Id. U.S. citizens
and organizations brought suit challenging his exclusion from the United States. Id. The court entertained
the case based on the limited review permitted in Mandel and found that the government had provided a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for Adams’s exclusion. Id. at 650.

89. Aside from the Second Circuit, only three other federal appellate courts have read Mandel to permit judicial

review in cases involving consular visa denials, as distinguished from a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility.
See Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1060; Adams, 909 F.2d at 647–48; Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1050.

90. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The Ninth Circuit has

explicitly rejected the Government’s distinction, for purposes of permitting some judicial review of a
constitutional claim, between a consular officer’s denial of a visa and the Attorney General’s denial of a
waiver of inadmissibility.”). While the Second Circuit did not address the broad holding of the Ninth
Circuit, this does not necessarily indicate that the court would be unwilling to entertain challenges
based on other constitutional interests.

91.

Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061.

92.

Id. at 1062.

93.

Id.
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explanation for the denial of [her husband’s] visa application pursuant to the limited
inquiry authorized by Mandel.”94
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning makes sense from a logical perspective, as well as
from the perspective of those most affected by the denial.95 When constitutional
rights are implicated by actions of the government, citizens should have an avenue to
judicial review. The Ninth Circuit seemed to apply the language and spirit of Mandel
as supporting its decision to exercise judicial review. The Supreme Court in Mandel
stated that it declined to consider what “First Amendment or other grounds” would be
available for challenge when a consular officer’s decision was not facially legitimate
and bona fide.96 Adding the words “or other grounds” implies that reviewable
challenges would not be limited to claims involving only the First Amendment.
Not all visa denials can be reviewed in court; there are simply too many for
courts to be able to provide an individualized review.97 But there is a potential for
developing a limited review that strikes a balance between the competing interests of
efficient visa processing and ensuring avenues for judicial review. Federal courts
should review all constitutional claims of U.S. citizens relating to consular decisions—
pursuant to jurisdiction over federal questions granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1331—and not
just those claims implicating the First Amendment.98 As the Ninth Circuit discussed
in Bustamante, “[t]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—
life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally
adequate procedures.”99 Neither Mandel, Abourezk, nor Allende articulated a reason
94. Id.
95. Family unity is a concern for many people seeking to obtain visas. See Memorandum from Denise A.

Vanison et al., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Director, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (undated), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.
aspx?docid=32746. A lawsuit is currently pending in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California regarding the situation when a consular officer determines that a beneficiary of a
petition under the Child Status Protection Act is not a “child” and then denies the visa on said grounds.
See Cuellar de Osorio v. Scharfen, No. EDCV 08-0840 (C.D. Cal. filed June 23, 2008). The petitioning
parent may now seek review of the decision under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. To
date, both appellee’s and appellant’s briefs have been filed. For more information and to read the
appellant’s briefs filed in the case, see Child Status Protection Act, Shusterman.com, http://shusterman.
com/childstatusprotectionact.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).

96. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 at 770 (1972).
97.

For example, in fiscal year 2008, the State Department issued 470,099 immigrant visas and 6,603,073
nonimmigrant visas. U.S. Dep’t of State, Table I: Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas Issued at
Foreign Service Posts Fiscal Years 2004–2008, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AR-TableI.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). For immigrant visas, 291,792 were refused and 2,083,726
nonimmigrant visas refused (keeping in mind, however, that an individual can apply for and be denied a
visa more than once in a fiscal year). U.S. Dep’t of State, Table XX: Immigrant and Nonimmigrant
Visa Ineligibilities (by Grounds for Refusal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act)
Fiscal Year 2008, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08-AR-TableXX.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).

98. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

99. 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
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for limiting judicial review of consular decisions to only First Amendment claims.100
The lack of elaboration or clarification on the part of the Supreme Court in Mandel
regarding what “other grounds” might warrant reviewability may have contributed to
the lower courts’ reluctance to expand the doctrine beyond the confines of the First
Amendment.101 The Supreme Court has not addressed consular nonreviewability
since Mandel.102 At the same time, the limited review conducted in Mandel signals
that some additional review is already permissible.103 The ability to challenge a
consular officer’s decision regarding a visa denial should not remain confined only to
U.S. citizen plaintiffs with First Amendment claims.104
Important interests are implicated when a consular officer makes a decision.105 At
stake in visa determinations are the due process interests of U.S. citizens, companies,
and universities wishing to bring foreign nationals into the United States.106 When a
U.S. citizen seeks to have a family member join them in the United States, visa
denials implicate more serious interests than the First Amendment interests found in
cases involving academic conferences, including Mandel and American Academy of
Religion.107 U.S. citizens should be entitled to judicial review as well, if not more so,
100. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 764–65 (acknowledging the importance of the right to receive information

under the First Amendment); Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988); Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

101. Nafziger, supra note 6, at 33 (noting that “the opinion contributed to the snowballing effect of the

plenary power doctrine by encouraging judicial abstention,” and that “[w]ithout much elaboration
several lower court decisions have therefore precluded review of consular discretion”).

102. See, e.g., Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988) (regarding

an appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with a consular determination refusing a
nonimmigrant visitor’s visa).

103. Nafziger, supra note 6, at 34 (“Mandel ’s ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ test has encouraged

limited reviewability. After all, the courts did in fact review Mandel itself, and the foreign applicant was
at least a nominal co-plaintiff. Thus, the plenary power doctrine may be going through a sixth stage
that is beginning to stall the movement of the ‘plenary power’ snowball, or even melt it.”).

104. Wildes, supra note 77, at 907 (recommending judicial review where there was a “substantial interest” in

the foreign national’s admission into the United States); Zas, supra note 7, at 595 (noting that judicial
review should be open in those cases where an important interest affecting a U.S. citizen, legal resident,
or U.S. company is involved).

105. Wildes, supra note 77, at 907– 08.
106. “The Commission believes that consular decisions denying or revoking visas in specified visa categories,

including, all immigrant visas and those LDA categories where there is a petitioner in the United States
who is seeking the admission of the visa applicant, should be subject to formal administrative review.”
U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant
Policy 181 (1997).

107. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 588, 2007 WL 4527504, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20,

2007). In both Mandel and American Academy of Religion, the “symbolic plaintiffs” (Ernst Mandel and
Tariq Ramadan, respectively) were seeking to enter the United States in order to attend symposia and
conferences involving universities and other academic groups. See id. at *1–2; Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756.
Most challenges to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability continue to involve academic issues
implicating First Amendment rights because of the limitation on what grounds a consular officer’s
decision will be reviewed. See, e.g., Am. Sociological Ass’n v. Chertoff, 588 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (2008)
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based on the intimate nature of their complaint.108 Decisions that carry such
significant consequences, such as disrupting family unity, should not be left in the
hands of the “most inexperienced State Department staff. . . . [and] the most junior
in the profession.”109 The courts’ deferential stance seems anachronistic and misplaced
in an age where facilitating the movement of people across borders is crucial for
business, familial, and academic purposes.110
If the Second Circuit adopts an expansive view of judicial review to encompass
all constitutional rights, the courts will not be flooded with litigation. The review
would be very limited because only U.S. citizens or companies whose constitutional
issues are affected by the denial of the visa would have standing.111 A foreign national
would not be granted any new rights under such treatment.112 Limiting review to
cases where a “substantial interest in the alien’s eligibility for admission to the United
States” is present strikes a balance between a complete lack of judicial review and
excessive judicial review.113 Also, the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard is
extremely deferential—only requiring a reason for the denial that is based in law
(i.e., a particular provision of the INA) and proper treatment of the visa claim by the
consular official—and is thus not likely to result in numerous reversals.114
(holding that the organization that invited a South African professor to the United States in order to
attend events stated a constitutionally based claim for judicial review).
108. U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform, supra note 105, at 181.
109. Doris Meissner, Immigration in the Post 9-11 Era, 40 Brandeis L.J. 851, 853–54 (2002) (noting that

consular work “has never ranked in the panoply of rewards to which the best and brightest aspire”).

110. Id. at 853 (explaining the economic and security implications behind immigration policy).
111. Angelo A. Paparelli & Mitchell C. Tilner, A Proposal for Legislation Establishing a System of Review of

Visa Refusals in Selected Cases, 65 Interpreter Releases 1027, 1027–32 (1988) (advocating for judicial
review of immigrant and non-immigrant visa denials, only excluding review of refusals to crewmen,
tourist and in transit visas); Note, Judicial Review of Visa Denials: Reexamining Consular Nonreviewability,
52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1137, 1164 (1977) (advocating for judicial review to be limited to immigrant visa
denials to avoid burdening federal courts).

112. A foreign national’s rights would not be expanded, but rather the U.S. citizen would have the right to

challenge the consular officer’s denial of the visa application.

113. See Wildes, supra note 77, at 907 (discussing a proposed bill that would allow judicial review in cases in

which there was a “substantial interest” in the foreign nationals’ presence in the United States). Wildes
gives examples of immediate relatives, and certain employment-based visas. Id. Wildes also notes that
“[i]n each of the chosen categories is a clear interest of an American business, citizen, or lawful resident,
or to any alien who has commenced training or schooling in the United States.” Id.; see also Martin,
supra note 83, at 812–15.

114. The “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard is not a very helpful one. As Nafziger notes, “[i]n

practice, the Mandel standard offers an uncertain measure of constitutional protection. Some courts
appear to have accepted ‘almost any reason the government offers,’ so long as it is not patently absurd,
while other courts have scrutinized visa denials more carefully.” Nafziger, supra note 6, at 35 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 149,
164 (1987)); see, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647–50 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding the grant of
summary judgment proper where the “State Department had competent evidence upon which it could
reasonably find that Adams participated in terrorist activities”).
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Taking into consideration both the above arguments for extending judicial review
and the Second Circuit’s decision providing a limited judicial review of consular
decisions, a case similar to Burrafato v. U.S. Department of State may have a different
result if decided today.115 Burrafato was an early Second Circuit case dealing with
consular nonreviewability.116 In Burrafato, an Italian citizen married to a U.S. citizen
was denied a visa.117 The Italian citizen and his U.S. citizen wife filed a complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on claims that the visa denial violated
the wife’s constitutional rights and that the failure to state reasons for the visa denial
deprived the husband of procedural due process.118 In dismissing the complaint, the
Second Circuit held that a U.S. citizen spouse’s constitutional rights are not violated
by deportation of an alien spouse.119
Based on American Academy of Religion, a matter involving a U.S. citizen spouse
and foreign national applicant may well be entertained in the Second Circuit given
the limited judicial review afforded to First Amendment claims. The Burrafato case
was decided soon after Mandel, before any case law or commentary had developed
regarding the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.120 Since Mandel was decided,
there has been much criticism of the doctrine, and valid arguments have consistently
been posited for expanding the limited review.121 The Second Circuit undoubtedly
recognized jurisdiction for the plaintiff ’s claim in American Academy of Religion by
relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.122 As the court stated, “[t]he Plaintiffs allege that the
denial of Ramadan’s visa violated their First Amendment rights, and subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim is clearly supplied by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”123
115. 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). For other cases involving the denial of a

spouse’s immigrant visa, see Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976); Pena v.
Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

116. 523 F.2d 554. This case was decided in 1975, just three years after Mandel, which was decided in 1972.
117. Id. at 555.
118. Id. at 554–55.
119. Id. (citing Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1975)).
120. Nafziger, supra note 6, at 33 (“Mandel has aroused considerable commentary, some of which has

misinterpreted it to confirm the notion of judicial non-reviewability even though it clearly upheld the
right to review under some circumstances. Because the decision is rather fuzzy around the edges, it
leaves more questions than it resolves about the extent to which visa denials are reviewable.”).
Additionally, at the time of Burrafato, the concept of substantive due process rights was just beginning
to develop. Today, such concepts are an established constitutional protection. See, e.g., Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

121. See, e.g., Sam Bernsen, Consular Absolutism in Visa Cases, 63 Interpreter Releases 388 (1986);

Nafziger, supra note 6; Paparelli & Tilner, supra note 111; Harry Rosenfield, Consular Non-reviewability:
A Case Study in Administrative Absolutism, 41 A.B.A. J. 1109 (1955); Wildes, supra note 77; Note, supra
note 111; Zas, supra note 7. While beyond the scope of this case comment, the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability seems even more problematic in the face of the Administrative Procedure Act. See
Wildes, supra note 77, at 899 (explaining that judicial review is not precluded under the APA and
therefore should be available as a matter of common law as expressed by the APA).

122. Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 123.
123. Id.
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Furthermore, by allowing for judicial review, the Second Circuit took a liberal
reading of Mandel, which indicates that the court may be open to further challenges
to the consular nonreviewability doctrine.124
Based on Mandel, there is reason to believe that grounds for reviewability could
and should be expanded. The Second Circuit should continue to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s approach to consular nonreviewability. The significance of judicial review
cannot be overstated. Where a U.S. citizen has a constitutional interest in the
admittance of another individual into the United States, a consular officer’s denial of
a visa application should be subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure that U.S. citizen’s
constitutional rights are being protected.

124. As noted previously, it is not a foregone conclusion that Mandel would be read to permit limited judicial

review. See, e.g., Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 212, 1213, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
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